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'There are no objective values" (p. 15).1 With this bold pronouncement 
John Mackie begins chapter one of Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong and 
abruptly introduces the central thesis of his anti-realist metaethics. He 
grants that ordinary moral judgments presuppose objective values, but he 
holds that these values are mythical and much of his argument is meant to 
show why such belief in objective values is false. He aims to demonstrate 
how both ordinary moral thinking and philosophical moral theorizing can 
be successful without subscribing to objective values. This paper will 
address what real effect, if any, that Mackie's view has on moral realism. I 
will borrow Geoffrey Sayre-McCord's definition of realism as the view mat 
makes two postulates: "(1) the claims in question, when literally construed, 
are literally true or false (cognitivism), ana (2) some are literally true" (Sayre-
McCord 1988a: 5). Of course, the claims in question in this case are moral 
claims. This version of moral realism is intentionally modest and sketchy 
but I intend, as a consequence of my analysis of Mackie, to strengthen and 
make explicitly clear, my own version of moral realism. 
My analysis of Mackie will cover the following areas: 1) his notion of 
objective value, 2) his metaethical methodology which I term the 'isolatory 
method', 3) his attempt at outlining a normative ethics in light of his 
metaethical skepticism, and 4) his understanding of the concept 'institution'. 
I shall offer a moral realist response to each of these areas and the rebuttals 
will culminate into a uniform thesis which I term 'contextual moral realism'. 
The first necessary step in an analysis of Mackie's argument is to look 
more closely at what ne means by saying, 'there are no objective values.' 
says, "Plato's Forms give a dramatic picture of what objective v a l u e s n u u i u 
have to be" and "..it is held that just knowing [the Forms] or 'seeing' them 
will not merely tell men what to do but will ensure that they do it" and 
'being acquainted with the Forms of the Good and Justice ana Beauty and 
the rest, [the philosopher-kings] will, by this knowledge alone, without any 
further motivation, be impelled to pursue and promote these ideals" (pp. 23¬ 
24, 40, 49). But why do objective values "nave to be", as Mackie says, 
necessarily motivating? To say that objective values must be this way, is an 
overstatement because there are other ways to conceive of objective values. 
For example, we can conceive them as non-necessarily motivating. It is quite 
easy to think of common everyday examples in which people admit that 
they know what the morally right thing to do is but other (non-moral) 
factors override their moral sense. Acting in accord with objective values is 
difficult and to cast them as necessarily motivating seems to me to be only 
one way (not the only way) of considering the nature of objective values. 
Even when we consider the philosopher-kings themselves who have 
received the best training and education it is conceivable that when absolute 
power of the state is conferred upon them, they might not be able to handle 
this new-found power. They are finite beings that are mutable and 
corruptible, not gods, and notwithstanding their knowledge of the Forms, 
1 Unless otherwise stated, page references are to Ethics: Inventing Right and 
Wrong (London: Penguin Books, 1977). 
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2 For more on this issue see for e.g. Brink 1989, pp. 197-209. 
their ability to act in accordance with the Forms may get affected by their 
new practical role in human affairs. 
Besides Plato, Mackie's view on what objective values would "have to 
be" may also be traceable to John Stuart Mill's objective utilitarianism. Mill's 
point that "education... should establish in the mind of every individual an 
indissoluble association between his own happiness and the good of the 
whole..." seems to be along the same lines as Plato's knowledge of the moral 
Forms which is supposedly attained through extensive education (Mill 1861: 
17). It would be fair to say mat both Plato and Mill were internalists because 
bom agree that after becoming acquainted with moral knowledge (through 
education), the individual will be, ipso facto, motivated to bring about the 
greater good. 
It is important to bear in mind that Mackie's attack on moral realism 
relies heavily on this old-fashioned account of internalist objective values. In 
defining objective values he uses an outdated, far-fetched internally-
motivating concept and then offers arguments to show that this sort of value 
could not possibly exist because it is metaphysically and epistemologically 
queer. Of the 5 reasons Mackie offers against objective values, (1) relativity, 
(2) queerness, (3) supervenience, (4) knowledge of the supervenience 
relation, and (5) patterns of objectification in our language, (p.49), I will only 
focus on (2),(3) and (4) because only they pose genuine difficulties for the 
moral realist. 
There is a well-known counter to (1) which Mackie himself recognizes 
and briefly discusses. Namely that "objective values....are not specific moral 
rules or codes but very general basic principles which are recognized at least 
implicitly to some extent in all society" (p. 37). He states that mis counter is 
only partly effective against the argument from relativity. His reply is that 
in ordinary moral thought people do not only judge right or wrong with the 
use of these general principles but they also judge by the immediate 
response of their 'moral sense'. Due to the variable response of the moral 
sense, people will inevitably respond differently and consequently, relativity 
is issued m. But since Mackie makes a partial concession, namely that in 
addition to the moral sense people also use general principles in their moral 
reasoning, the argument from relativity (at least Mackie's formulation of it) 
is not in Tull force" (p.38).2 
Mackie doesn't assert reason (5) as an independent reason for denying 
objective values. His rationale is that the above 4 reasons should persuade 
us to reject the common-sense belief in objective values "provided that we 
can explain how this belief, if it is false, has become established..." (p.42). So 
reason (5) is compelling only if reasons (1) though (4) are accepted. 
The first point of this paper is to show that objective values as defined 
by Mackie may be rejected hut there are other conceptions of objective value 
that can nevertheless be maintained. A more intuitive sense of objective 
value that Mackie considers but quickly dismisses is "that there are some 
things which are valued by everyone" (p.23). This is the sense of 'objective' 
which is close to what is usually meant by 'universal'. Although intuitive 
and perhaps less demanding than Mackie's sense of objective value, it is 
rejected for the reason that it does not capture the proper meaning of 
'objective value'. The proper meaning, according to Mackie, is the meaning 
which is presupposed in normal, day-to-day moral judgments. He mentions 
that 'being valued by everyone' or the simple fact of agreement among 
people, does not entail objectivity. The agreement of everyone on certain 
values may simply reflect an intersubjecbvity. Mackie maintains that an 
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3 eg., Blackburn 1971, Blackburn 1988, Horgan & Timmons, 1992. 
supervenience argument (p. 41). 3 Mackie maintains that the moral realist has 
to explain how moral features are linked to natural features. But he believes 
it is a mystery how such a link can obtain, and further, if there was a link 
between these two domains of properties, then how can we discern the 
links? 
Another way of bringing out this queerness is to ask, 
about anything that is supposed to have some objective 
moral quality, now this is linked with its natural features. 
What is the connection between the natural fact that an 
action is a piece of deliberate cruelty—say, causing pain 
just for fun—and the moral fact that it is wrong? It cannot 
be an entailment, a logical or semantic necessity. Yet it is 
not merely that the two features occur together. The 
wrongness must somehow be 'consequential' or 
'supervenient'.... (p.41). 
Although Mackie only briefly mentions this notion of 'supervenience', it 
is an issue that has occupied a prominent place in moral theorizing. This 
problem of accounting for the exact relationship between natural features 
and moral features has been made to look insuperable by recent opponents 
of moral realism, but my claim will be that the supervenience problem can 
be dealt with (and not, contra Horgan & Timmons, just by labelling the 
relation sui generis). I intend to show that Mackie's supervenience difficulty 
stems from his radical empiricism, or as I term it—the isolatory method. It is 
a faulty metaethical procedure which has two essential components: 1) a 
certain conception of identity, and 2) empiricism. It might be useful in other 
areas of inquiry but for ethics it is an unnecessarily austere methodology. 
According to those who advocate the supervenience argument against 
moral realism, the dichotomy between facts and values (or is's and ought's) 
is thought to be treacherous because we cannot establish a one-to-one 
identity correspondence between facts and values. I acknowledge that the 
moral realist must account for the relationship between moral features and 
natural features but I disagree that we need to uncover a one-to-one identity 
correspondence in order to understand the relationship properly. 
For Mackie, the supervenience problem has a metaphysical aspect and 
an epistemological aspect. The metaphysical aspect is "now such values 
could be consequential or supervenient upon natural features," and the 
epistemological aspect is, "accounting for our knowledge of value entities or 
features and of their links with the features on which they would be 
consequential" (p.49). The identity correspondence criterion is part of the 
epistemological aspect and a re-statement of the difficulty, in somewhat 
clearer terms, is offered by Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons: "Even if 
goodness, for instance, is identical to some specific natural property, there 
remains the task of explaining why this natural property, rather than any 
other one(s), counts as the correct referent of the term goodness'" (Horgan & 
Timmons 1992:230). Both Mackie and his followers insist on isolating a one-
to-one correspondence between a natural property and a moral property and 
when this cannot be done, they conclude that moral properties are not real. I 
don't believe we have to accept this identity criterion when looking for 
moral properties. In the later sections of the chapter I will offer an 
alternative method for locating the link between natural and moral features, 
viz., a contextual method. 
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The second component of Mackie's isolatory method is his empiricism 
which is not to be confused with positivism.- In the following passage he 
distinguishes between liberal empiricists and logical positivists: 
Although logical positivism with its verifiability 
theory of descriptive meaning gave an impetus to non-
cognitive accounts of ethics, it is not only logical 
positivists but also empiricists of a much more liberalsort 
who should find objective values hard to accommodate. 
Indeed, I would not only reject the verifiability principle 
but also deny the conclusion commonly drawn from it, 
that moral judgements lack descriptive meaning. The 
assertion that there are objective values or intrinsically 
prescriptive entities or features of some kind, which 
ordinary moral judgements presuppose, is, I hold, not 
meaningless but raise (pp. 39-40). 
Even though it is tempting to categorize Mackie as a non-cognitivist because 
he denies moral realism, it is more correct to consider him a cognitivist who 
held an error theory for he explicitly claims that he disagrees with the 
positivists in their opinion of ethical statements. Positivists maintain that 
moral statements are non-verifiable and therefore meaningless; whereas 
Mackie believes moral statements are meaningful and even take truth-
values. The truth-value that he feels belongs to objective value statements is 
false. There may be other kinds of value statements mat he believes can be 
true. On page 25 he says "there are certain kinds of value statements which 
undoubtedly can be true or false, even if, in the sense I intend, there are no 
objective values" (p.25). 
It is clear from the preceding quotation from the Ethics that Mackie 
believes only the positivists should be termed radical and he should not, but 
if we look closely at Mackie's arguments, I mink Mackie's •'liberal' empiricism 
is also radical albeit in a different way. He thinks he is liberal because he 
grants that moral statements take truth values, but he is radical because he is 
asking too much, i.e., he employs an unnecessarily austere methodology of 
metaethical analysis. He is asking that an analysis of ethics provide him 
with clear fact/value correspondence and insight into the mysterious 
necessary motivation that is somehow to be found within objective values. 
Mackie's empiricist microscope, so to speak, will not detect objective values 
or moral facts. By becoming so enthralled in the metaethical meaning of 
moral terms, and analyzing each moral term discretely, he cannot see the 
interconnectedness of moral language and its relationship to the larger 
context of the human condition. He is trying to extract the meaning of moral 
concepts after stripping them out of the human context. He finds that in 
isolation, moral concepts like objective value for example, are "entities or 
qualities or relations of a very strange sort" (p. 38). This is an 
understandable conclusion because if we try to understand something by 
dissecting it into its primary elements, this alone will not lead us to 
understanding. As well as attending to the details of each individual moral 
term, we must also attempt to grasp the overall, general scheme in which the 
individual term resides. Radical empiricists suffer from a kind of myopia, or 
missing the big picture. This point comes out if we consider Hume's 
discussion of causation. In The Cement of the Universe, Mackie summarizes 
Hume's discovery: 
his serious conclusion is the largely negative one that these 
[causal] inferences are to be ascribed to imagination and 
16 AUSLEGUNG 
custom rather than to reason, that we do not discover any 
necessity in 'the objects' that could serve as a basis and 
justification for these inferences, but that instead our very 
idea of necessity arises from those inferences: the 
supposed necessity is based on the inference, not the 
inference upon any perceived necessity (Mackie 1974:5-6). 
Hume was trying to isolate causation and the only way he could do it 
was to ascribe it to imagination and custom. Because he didn't 'see' the 
transference, he couldn't see' the causation happening and this was enough 
for him to doubt that causal necessity was 'in the objects'. I take this as a 
paradigm example of radical empirical analysis which, when faced with 
isolation difficulties, chooses to interpret important elements such as 
causation, or objective values, in the mental imagination rather than in the 
fabric of the world. 
In an early section of his Ethics Mackie remarks that he is interested in 
abandoning the linguistic analysis of moral terms because it generates more 
problems than it solves. He says, "the more work philosophers have done 
on meaning, both in ethics and elsewhere, the more complications have 
come to light" (p.20). This is why "it would be a mistake to concentrate 
second order ethical discussions on questions of meaning," and why Mackie 
chose to defend an ontological thesis (ibid). My point is that although 
Mackie overtly tried to escape the kind of moral theory that gets caught up 
in itself by analyzing and defining moral terms, he nevertheless retained an 
assumption that is embedded wimin this linguistic project. He is trying to 
understand ethics by breaking it down into primary elements. But when he 
looks at those elements, viz. the terms 'good, 'ought,' and 'objective value,' he 
doesn't see anything internally prescriptive about them. From this he 
concludes that a realist metaethics rests on queer elements that really don't 
exist because when he looked for them with his empiricist microscope he 
could not find them So his underlying assumption is a radical empiricist 
one. He assumes that empiricism is a tool for locating all real things. Rather 
than say his tool failed he is prepared to say ethics is not real in the sense 
that the moral realist admits. 
This concludes my analysis of the isolatory method and its two aspects 
of identity correspondence and radical empiricism. Now I intend to make 
good on a promissory note I extended earlier in my discussion of objective 
values. I intend to show how Mackie shrouds intrinsically desirable values 
in different terminology and proceeds to employ them in the later chapters 
of Ethics which are devoted to normative theory rather than metaethical 
analysis. 
in the early parts of the book where he focuses solely on metaethical 
questions he seems to have an agenda in mind that is similar to the Cartesian 
method of doubt. Descartes intended to remove all thoughts from his mind 
and attempted to establish knowledge on solid foundations by piecing 
together thoughts that he could clearly and distinctly perceive to be true. It 
turns out that Descartes rebuilds knowledge to roughly the same state it was 
in before he tore it down. He ended up simply finding new arguments for 
the same old conclusions, for instance mind/body dualism and the existence 
of God. The same holds true for Mackie. In his metaethical discussions he 
wipes the slate clean by making ethics seem like something that we do not 
discover but that which we create. But later in his recommendations for 
what a normative theory should look like, he uses precisely those concepts 
which he previously wiped away. First he offers an attack on ethics and 
then for the rest of his book he is saying the same thing every other 
(conservative) etiuost before him said. 
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Even Simon Blackburn, a fellow anti-realist, notices this: "in the second 
part of the book he is quite happy to go to express a large number of 
straightforward moral views about the good fife, about whether it is 
permissible to commit suicide or abortion, and so on" (Blackburn 1993:149¬ 
150). Blackburn wonders why, if moral vocabulary is imbued with error, 
that we would choose to fall into error by developing a normative theory. 
He notes that Mackie feels legitimated in venturing mto normative theory 
because he takes the Humean approach to morality, viz. that ethics is 
malleable not discoverable. 
Mackie also feels he is justified in working up a normative theory 
because of his view that second-order moral views and first-order moral 
views are independent. Mackie holds that there is nothing wrong with 
being a skeptic about the former and a non-skeptic about the latter. "What I 
am discussing is a second order view....fhese first and second order views 
are not merely distinct but completely independent: one could be a second 
order moral sceptic without being a first order one, or again the other way 
round" (p.16). I think there is something wrong with this. I am not alone in 
believing there are logical and practical relations that obtain between 
metaethics and normative ethics (for e.g., Tannsio 1976, Brink 1989). I think 
the connections between these types of moralizing will come out if we 
consider Mackie's covert use of 'objective values' in the later chapters of his 
book. 
The general argument running through the whole of Mackie's Ethics 
reveals that he is striving for a pliable ethics which we can use to create 
whatever it is we dub as 'correct' ethical behavior. So although many of the 
earlier sections of the book are devoted to discussing the implausibility of 
objective values, the later sections give us a sketch of how we are to apply 
what we have discovered about ethics, viz. that it is wholly made by humans 
and not discovered in the fabric of the world. Mackie's intention is to 
develop a normative theory without the use of objective values, God or 
religion—a purely secular morality. In this paragraph I have been liberally 
using the first person plural, but it is a genuine question to ask Mackie just 
who this 'we' is that is inventing right and wrong. It is apparent from the 
following quotation that we' does not refer to humankind: 
Mankind is not an agent; it has no unity of decision; it is 
therefore not confronted with any choices....a plurality of 
interacting rational agents does not in general constitute a 
rational agent, and the resultant of a number of choices 
is not in general a choice (p. 122). 
It is apparent from the following two quotations that we' somewhat refers to 
each human individually, but the individual must be a part of a social circle 
of varying size in order to be successful in altering the face of morality: 
It does not follow....that an individual is free to invent a 
moral system at will. If a morality is to perform the sort of 
function described in Chapter 5, it must be adopted 
socially by a group of people in their dealings with one 
another. Of course, there can be and are larger and 
smaller social circles (p. 147). 
What counts is rules that are actually recognized by the 
members of some social circle, large or small, ana that 
thus set up expectations and claims. Innovations and 
reforms are not excluded, but they must be possibly 
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This feature of a liberal society can be explained equally well by a realist 
theory or an anti-realist theory. The anti-realist will declare that society 
must permit a potpourri of subjective tastes because there are differing 
conceptions of the good. The claim that society should be sufficiently liberal 
to prevent the infringement of rights and privileges of its citizens can be 
explained by the realist by saying mat this feature is an objective moral truth 
about societies. 
The thing that I am trying to uncover, which I believe will help to 
understand and locate the precise point of departure between going from a 
natural fact to a moral fact, is Mackie's choice of direction to which he wishes 
to push ethics. If ethics is as pliant as he seems to argue, then the question 
comes up as to where or what we would like a 'good' ethics to lead. But first 
we must stipulate what it is that makes an ethics good. Is it good in an 
objectivist sense or in a subjective sense? Must we close our eyes to the 
metaethical questions, as Mackie does, when talking about normative issues? 
He does put forward goals mat a first-order normative ethics should try to 
achieve and he offers some characteristics of what he believes would 
constitute a 'good ethics'. But what are the standards that enable him to say 
which goals we should seek and what are the ideas that underlie what it 
means to be a morality? He states that the function of morality "is primarily 
actual, not purely Utopian What the individual can do 
is to remember that there are, in the different circles of 
relationship with which he is concerned, various 
fragments of a moral system which already contributes 
very considerably to countering specifiable evils which he, 
like others, will see as evils: that he can put pressure on 
some fragments of the system, so that they come gradually 
to be more favourable to what he sees as valuable or 
worthwhile (p. 148). 
Saying that we create morality rather than discover it sounds very anti-
realist but I will claim that a pliable ethics like the one just outlined in the 
two preceding quotations is quite compatible with a realist as well as an 
anti-realist theory. Take, for instance, the last line in the immediately 
preceding quote mat indicates how the individual can attempt to modify the 
status quo moral system; mis agent is trying to make the moral system more 
in line with what she takes as valuable or worthwhile. The realist can 
interject at mis point that certain basic moral truths (those 'common moral 
principles' or 'intrinsically desirable values' mentioned earlier) will always be 
seen as valuable and worthwhile, that yes we learn about them through 
contingent circumstances but they nonetheless suggest moral knowledge. 
Mackie's moral skepticism is a negative doctrine, it says what there isn't, 
namely objective values, and his subjectivism is a positive doctrine that says 
what there is, viz. subjective values. When Mackie is explaining his 
normative theory, then, he should only rely on subjective values. And 
pointing to the pliability of ethical systems seems to be consistent with a 
subjective value system Because morals are essentially subjective, society 
should be liberal enough to allow for differing subjective tastes. Mackie 
seems to be making a Rawlsian point with the following: 
....since there will always be divergent conceptions of the 
good, different preferred kinds of life, a good form of 
society must somehow be a liberal one, it must leave open 
ways in which different preferences can be realized...(p. 
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to counteract..... limitation of men's sympathies" (p.108). A realist way to 
look at it is to say that the function of morality is to implement objective 
values to the best of our ability. Since Mackie is offering a normative ethics 
which he thinks applies to everyone, the values he is pushing for sound 
objective in the sense that they ought to be universally endorsed even if we 
are not particularly motivated to do so. This is the alternative way of 
understanding objective value that I adumbrated above. I believe Mackie 
must implicitly rely on this kind of objective value if he is to get a normative 
ethics even off the ground. If every value is simply created and totally 
subjective then I have to ask why I should care to bother about sympathies 
or selfishness if I don't wish to? He is presupposing certain values here, viz. 
(1) sympathy is a good, and (2) unrestrained selfishness is an evil, but does it 
make sense to say that (1) and (2) are subjective values? In order for his 
normative theory to be internally consistent, it is required mat these values 
he is relying upon are construed as objective. If Mackie is prepared to say 
that he is only offering his personal ethics which he does not intend to have 
any bearing on anyone else's ethics then it would be consistent to employ 
subjective values. But if he doesn't intend his discussion to reveal only his 
personal ethics (and it. seems that he doesn't), then we can ask, why ought 
we believe that all moralities should have these elements? When he makes 
broad statements like 'the object of morality is such and such' or 'all morality 
is such and such', it seems as if he is making an objective statement. It is a 
statement that will apply to all moralities inclusively and exhaustively. On 
page 172 he says that "any plausible view of the good for man, any viable 
concept of happiness, will, I believe, have this general form." The form 
involves rights and property. To say that there is a good for man or that all 
men have certain rights sounds objective. Mackie cannot wiggle his way out 
of this by saying he has a very specific sense of what he means by objective 
value' because as I have shown above, his strict sense of objective value is 
factitious. These values that underlie Mackie's normative theory are 
objective in the straightforward sense that I have explained earlier, viz., 
'values that should be valued by all persons whether they acknowledge them, 
or are motivated by them or not.' Since Mackie is presupposing these 
universal values in his normative theory, ones that are objective in the 
intrinsically desirable sense, I have shown that Mackie falls back on realist 
assumptions. Or at least that Mackie's pliable ethics is easily accommodated 
into a realist's perspective on ethics. 
The remainder of the paper will be devoted to developing a kind of 
realism that is compatible with Mackie's notion of 'institution' which is an 
idea that he seems to borrow from John Searle. After Mackie has shown us 
that we cannot isolate the 'objective prescriptivity' in a natural fact, he 
teaches us that putative moral properties, those generally thought to exist 
objectively, in fact really exist only m a contextual setting of what he calls an 
'institution.' He mentions, for example, that the is-ought gap can be bridged, 
albeit "only by speaking within some institution" (p.72). in his discussion of 
institutions, Mackie uses the example (which he takes from John Searle) of 
breaking a promise as an instance of immorality; it is only immoral against a 
suitable backdrop or an 'institution'. He agrees with this 'institutional' 
explanation but he feels that moral realism will only be vindicated if 
objective values are found to exist, in isolation, outside or an institution. It is 
important for Mackie's argument that he locate purported moral properties 
somewhere because they are referred to daily in normal discourse. Mackie 
says his theory is an 'error theory' because "although most people in making 
moral judgments implicitly claim, among other things, to be pointing to 
something objectively prescriptive, these claims are all false" (p.35). Thus 
Mackie offers a place, a setting in which these moral properties which we 
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freely refer to, reside. Talk of moral properties only makes sense against a 
backdrop of an institution, but precisely because moral properties only 
reside in a context and not in isolation Mackie believes this confirms his 
thesis of the pliability of ethics or the true 'created* nature of ethics. He 
maintains that we create, not discover, ethical truths. Mackie's support for 
this conception of ethics is roughly the following: (1) We cannot find 
objective values in isolation so they are not real. (2) We can find values in 
context so they must not be objectively real. I have problems with both of 
these premises. The first might be explained by Mackie's ill-suited isolatory 
method which I have already discussed. The second premise might be 
explained by developing a contextual realism 
One way of doing this is to bring together Mackie's notion of 
'institution' with David O. Brink's notion of 'constitution.' Brink offers us a 
way of bypassing Mackie's reliance on an identity between natural facts and 
moral facte by offering the explanation that moral facts are not identical 
with, but constituted by, natural facts. Brink explains that, "moral facts and 
properties are constituted by, and so supervene upon, natural (i.e., natural 
and social scientific) facts and properties. Determinations of just which 
natural facts and properties constitute which moral facts and properties is a 
matter of substantive moral theory...." (Brink 1989:177-178). This seems to 
be a very fruitful method. Making this distinction offers an understanding 
of the relationship between natural facts and moral facts. 
But the constitution of moral facts by natural facts is still a concept that 
needs more analysis. It is, of course, of direct relevance to the supervenience 
problem Although we cannot explicitly tell exactly which natural facts offer 
necessary and sufficient conditions for becoming moral facts, should we give 
up the project? I don't think we should. The moral/natural relation might 
be similar to the relations found between ecosystems for example. There is 
so much inter-level connection among ecosystems that the more we 
understand the less we know we know (Norton 1987:205). But notice that 
the ecosystem example is a case of strictly empirical scientific observation, 
one that is totally concerned with natural facts and yet we cannot find the 
relations between ecosystems. When we humans try to help particular 
ecosystems we often end up causing more harm than good because we 
cannot predict with accuracy what consequences our tamperings will have 
on the various parts of the environment. This is also true in the case of 
species extinction. If scientists can predict what effects a species becoming 
extinct will have on a whole ecosystem, for example, then we would be able 
to determine which species we wouldn't mind allowing to become extinct. 
Bryan G. Norton explains: 
To answer this kind of question one would have to know 
the detailed interrelationships and interdependencies 
among all the species. This requires, in turn, knowing 
which species are "keystone" species, knowing which 
species are redundant, and knowing how much the life 
cycles of various species can be disturbed before they can 
no longer support other species dependent upon them. 
Scientists are very far from having this sort of detailed 
understanding of any particular natural ecosystem. 
(Norton 1987:50) 
Our sciences cannot precisely predict the far-reaching, rippling effects that 
our tinkerings have on the environment because they do not adequately 
understand the relations between ecosystems. The same may be true of 
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There is a connection, then, between natural facts and moral facts but it 
only obtains in an institution or more generally, in a context At this time it 
would be helpful to draw a distinction between an 'institution' and a 
'context'. They both basically refer to systems of relationships. With both of 
these notions I have in mind what Norton called 'interrelationships and 
interdependences'. The difference between an 'institution' and a 'context' is 
that an institution is a narrower system of mterrehtionships because it has to 
do with essentially human-made practices, customs, traditions and the like. 
This understanding is supported by the etymological roots which means to 
establish, ordain or set up. 
A context, on the other hand, is a much broader term which covers all 
forms of being, whether human, non-human, animate or inanimate. This 
interpretation is etymologically sound also for its roots indicate a coming 
together, a coherence or a weave. It is clearly a much more general term 
than institution. 
Since the moral realist who advocates such notions as "common moral 
principles' or 'intrinsically desirable values' wants to say these notions are 
common in an inter-institutional way, then simply to say these common 
moral principles obtain within an institution comes up short. What is 
intended by the moral realist is that these common principles obtain (or at 
least ought to obtain) in att institutions. Therefore moral realists need to 
utilize a broader term. This is why I am suggesting a contextual moral 
realism, one that obtains in all institutions not just in a contingent few. 
Someone might point out that what I mean by contextual moral realism 
sounds very similar to objective moral realism This is true. But why, then, 
call it contextual at all? The reason is to highlight and impress upon the anti-
realist the fact that this brand of moral realism is not open to the isolatory 
criticisms such as supervenience, for example, which attempts to stalemate 
moral realism by asking it to supply identity conditions for natural features 
and moral features. A straightforward objective moral realism that doesn't 
employ the notion of context will not withstand the isolatory line of 
criticism. 
Let's say then that moral facts can only be located within a context. 
What follows from this? A first interpretation offered by someone of 
relativist bent such as Mackie would be quick to point out that ethics, since it 
depends on the contextual situation, must be an artificial creation. Since 
ethics can change depending on numerous contingencies surrounding the 
generation of the institution in question, we should not expect ethics to be 
anything other than a wholly invented creation. The relativist will ask why 
natural facts and moral facts. They are linked in deeply complex ways that 
simple linguistic analysis alone cannot elucidate. 
Mackie's negative thesis, which predicts the failure of any attempt to 
find exactly which natural facts are connected to terms such as 'ought and 
'good', might be perfectly true. However, if we place moral properties in a 
context or institution we find the connection starts to make sense. Mackie 
himself agrees to this when he reports that: 
the popular formulation of [Hume's] law is misleading. 
From sets of 'is'-statements which are purely factual, 
which conceal no value terms, we can derive not only 
hypothetically imperative 'ought'-statements but also 
moral ones. Admittedly we do so only by speaking within 
some institution (p.72). 
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A non-reductive naturalism of this sort explains Mackie's epistemological 
supervenience difficulty because it says there are not analytic relationships 
between moral facts and natural facts. And Mackie's metaphysical charge 
against moral realism is explained with the contextual thesis above. 
In conclusion, if I can reduce a human to its elements found on a 
periodic table have I made any headway towards truly understanding the 
4 "Supervenience Revisited", reprinted in (Blackburn 1993), p. 130. 
5 Dreier 1992, pp. 18-19. 
6 Sturgeon 1991, p32. 
we should falsely presume that ethics has any kind of objective value at its 
core given that it is built on shifting sands. 
A second interpretation of this contextual thesis, offered by someone 
inclined towards moral realism would look for the deeper meaning and 
might point out that moral properties are complex properties involved in 
complex relationships. It is no wonder to such a contextual realist that a 
moral property cannot be reduced to one natural fact. Understanding an 
objective value is not like 'seeing red' or analyzing terms like 'ought' or 
'good' in a definitional, linguistic, or isolatory, sense. It simply might be an 
attribute of the nature of moral properties that they can only be discovered 
in a social setting—somewhat like sociological facts. Although moral facts 
can only be found in contexts, and can only exist in contexts, this does not 
entail that they are not facts, or that they are less real than natural facts. It 
may be that we cannot isolate the nature of each particular moral fact and its 
exact relationship to natural facts, but that doesn t mean or entail that moral 
facts are insignificant. 
I am not saying that when we have a general idea of how something, 
(viz. a moral fact), is created, (viz. by its context), men we have the full story. 
Certainly we should try to uncover the detailed relationships between moral 
facts ana natural facts to the best of our ability. But there are different ways 
to approach this issue. Blackburn confesses that his challenge to the moral 
realist regarding the supervenience relation was originally aimed at Moore (I 
suspect the same is true of Mackie) and so it is not surprising that the 
supervenience argument might fail against other forms of moral realism.4 
James Dreier points out that the supervenience argument is a hollow victory 
over moral realism because no one holds Moore's non-naturalism anymore 
and there are other plausible forms of moral realism such as reductive 
naturalism and non-reductive naturalism that take the mystery out of the 
supervenience relation.5 
So, although the whole of the moral fact is reducible to a particular sum 
of natural parts it does not follow, then, that if we understand a set of 
natural facts we would not be able to tell which moral facts correlate with 
which natural facts. Nicholas Sturgeon explains the position of non-
reductive naturalism notably well: 
An older argument required that, if we are to regard moral 
facts as natural, we must possess an analytic reduction of 
moral to nonmoral terminology. But it has been decades 
since anyone seriously proposed a comparable 
requirement on any other branch of inquiry—such as 
biology or psychology—that wished to prove its 
naturalistic credentials, and it thus seems quite arbitrary to 
apply it (as I think few would now do) to ethics.6 
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human person? Analogously, if I reduce ethics to its basic elements will I 
truly understand the nature of ethics? No, both of these inquiries need a 
context—a realist context if we are to be provided with a complete picture of 
the human person and a complete picture of ethics. 
Although Mackie's goal was to argue against objective values, his 
conception of the content of ethics has revealed something fundamental 
about normative theory in general. Underlying his and probably anyone 
else's normative theory are objective values, values that universally apply to 
all. This presupposes realism, particularly the Sayre-McCord version of 
realism mentioned at the outset of the chapter, because statements about 
these objective values will have truth values that are literally true, i.e. inter-
institutionally. When we find a professed anti-realist presupposing objective 
values in normative theory it serves as a small victory for the moral realist in 
the debate about the nature of ethics. 
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